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Erich Lehmann's work on the foundations of probability and statistics is discussed 
in this chapter but his contributions in this area are dispersed over other chapters in 
this volume, particularly the chapter on his work on the history of classical statistics. 
The books Theory of Point Estimation (TPE) and Testing Statistical Hypotheses 
(TSH) also contain implicit and explicit ideas on the foundations of statistics. As 
expected, the Neyman-Pearson-Wald school is dominant in these works. In addition, 
Lehmann (2008) and the soon-to-be-published Fisher, Neyman, and the Creation of 
Classical Statistics, contain many of Erich's thoughts on philosophical issues and the 
historical breakthroughs that have impacted and provided directions for the future of 
the discipline. 
Erich commented in various occasions that he did not involve himself too much in 
the debate of the foundational issues of statistics. Thus, in DeGroot ( 1986), after having 
been asked if he thought about the foundations of probability, he stated: "I don't really 
think very much about foundational questions." In Lehmann (2008), responding to the 
self-posed question What is my outlook? Erich writes: 
Foundational issues have not been an active interest of mine. so I find it easiest to describe my 
attitude with a number of (rather superficial) comments ... 
His work, however, demonstrates otherwise. Erich believed in the frequentist inter-
pretation of probability but also understood that such a perspective is not applicable 
in some situations (see, e.g. page 188, Lehmann (2008)), and in Lehmann (2001) he 
discusses some of the philosophical shortcomings of such an interpretation. 
Erich was a strong believer in the Neyman-Pearson-Wald school of optimality, while 
recognizing its limitations. Thus, for example, in Lehmann (1985), Erich writes: 
Complete reliance on optimality, on the other hand, suffers from some drawbacks. 
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In particular, optimality considerations achieve solutions but only in simple 
situations, and such solutions may lack robustness and other desirable properties. 
There are at least three recurring themes in his work on foundational issues: (i) 
model selection; (ii) frequentist statistical inference; (iii) Bayesian statistical inference; 
and (iv) exploratory data analysis. Model selection has been discussed in Erich's 
contributions to the history of classical statistics. Therefore, attention will be focused 
on (ii), (iii), and (iv). 
It is interesting that the likelihood principle is not discussed in any of Erich's 
writings, as far as I have been able to ascertain, except for a brief reference in Lehmann 
(2008) to Berger and Wolpert (1984). This is a bit puzzling in light of the fact that one 
of his former Ph.D. students at Columbia University published, see Birnbaum (1962), a 
long treatise on the likelihood principle. The reader must surmise that Erich, rather than 
expressing his disagreement with the likelihood principle, decided not to discuss it. 
Erich viewed the trichotomy (ii), (iii), and (iv) as being ordered by the level of 
model assumptions made. Thus, (iv) does not make any assumptions of an underlying 
probability model, and lets the data speak for itself. The frequentist approach, on 
the other hand, relies on a probability model to carry out an evaluation of the 
statistical procedures under consideration, while the Bayesian approach introduces 
the additional component of the prior distribution. None of these three approaches 
is perfect, however. Exploratory data analysis, except in very limited cases, cannot 
determine if the observed effects in the analysis are indeed real without the use of a 
probability model, and the Bayesian paradigm has to deal with the selection of the 
prior distribution and the sensitivity of the solution to such a choice of prior. On 
the other hand, the frequentist Neyman-Pearson-Wald approach runs into problems 
in its search for a procedure that minimizes the risk uniformly (in the parameter). 
Since this is not possible, then attention has to be restricted to a class of procedures 
satisfying some additional principles none of which are always satisfactory. Against 
this background of lack of satisfaction with any given approach, Lehmann (1985) 
and Lehmann ( 1995) develop ideas that bridge the chasm that has been created by 
the heated philosophical debates. For example, Lehmann (1985) discusses how the 
Neyman-Pearson can contribute to the exploration of underlying data structure and its 
relation with Bayesian inference. In Lehmann (1995), Erich continues with this line of 
thought and writes that: 
In practice, the three approaches can often fruitfully interact, with each benefiting from 
considerations of the other points of view. 
It seems clear that modeljree data analysis, frequentist and Bayesian model-based inference 
and decision making each has its place. The question appears not to be - as it is often phrased 
- which is the correct approach but in what circumstances each is most appropriate. 
The reader learns to appreciate Erich's balanced view on foundational issues -he 
discusses both the benefits and the shortcomings of the various approaches to inference 
and interpretations of probability. 
Erich did not like confrontation and, given the tone of some of the published work 
on the philosophy of statistics, must have preferred to express his views in a low-key 
and conciliatory manner- but see Lehmann (1990) for an exception to this statement. 
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Erich writes, in Lehmann (2008), that his original position was solidly in the frequentist 
camp. With time, however, his position was somewhat influenced by classical Bayesian 
ideas, but remained unconvinced by the radical Bayesian position. Thus, he writes, in 
Lehmann (1995), that bridge building to the "radical" [Bayesian] position is more 
difficult. Erich never defined what he meant by a radical Bayesian position, but the 
reader may surmise that he was referring to a Bayesian paradigm that insists on the 
elicitation of a prior distribution at all costs. Thus, in Lehmann (2008), he writes: 
However, it seems to me that the strength of these beliefs tends to be rather fuzzy, and 
not sufficiently well defined and stable to assign a definite numerical value to it. If, with 
considerable effort, such a value is elicited, it is about as trustworthy as a confession extracted 
through torture. 
In the end, Erich's work reflects a philosophy that indicates that no single approach 
can be totally satisfactory. Rather than debating their differences, Erich proposed that 
a fruitful approach can be obtained from the bringing together of ideas from (ii), (iii), 
and (iv)- with (iii) serving as a bridge that connects all three. 
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